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The UN Convention Against Corruption is the only truly global convention
in corruption control. Separate and rather difficult negotiations were con-
ducted on a mechanism for the implementation of the treaty. These ne-
gotiations broke ground by providing, for the first time, peer review of a
United Nations treaty. This article, which is based on the authors’ close ob-
servations and interviews with key participants, seeks to show how the dy-
namics between technical experts and diplomats led to a resolution that
would not have occurred if either the technical experts or the diplomats
had acted alone. KEYWORDS: corruption, peer review, United Nations, ne-
gotiation impasse, experts, diplomats.
THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (UNCAC) ENTERED INTO
force in 2005.1 As of February 2012, it had been ratified by 159 states par-
ties, making it the only truly global convention on the prevention and con-
trol of corruption.2 As such, it allows for cooperation between industrialized
and developing countries as well as South-South cooperation. It therefore
can assist countries that have extensive corruption in developing an anticor-
ruption framework. It also offers a comprehensive framework that may help
them to receive targeted technical assistance. Additionally, UNCAC can pro-
vide a framework for bringing pressure to bear on countries that have so far
chosen to retain a hands-off policy toward corrupt practices in international
trade and development.
UNCAC contains both mandatory and nonmandatory provisions.
Among the mandatory provisions (“each State Party shall . . .”) are those
requiring the criminalization of active and passive bribery, embezzlement
by a public official, and money laundering. There also are several manda-
tory provisions on extradition and mutual legal assistance. States parties are
obliged, for example, to “afford one another the widest measure of mutual
legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in
relation to the offences” covered by UNCAC.3 Given the fact that klepto-
cratic officials have siphoned off billions of dollars from developing coun-
tries, and that large sums of money have been transferred to bank accounts
abroad,4 it is not surprising that developing countries have worked to
ensure that many of the provisions on asset recovery are mandatory.
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However, the impact of UNCAC is potentially weakened by the fact
that it is not self-executing. Each state party has to take domestic action (leg-
islation, policy formulation, allocation of resources) in order to implement
the provisions of UNCAC, both mandatory and nonmandatory. While the
objectives of UNCAC are specified throughout the treaty, agreement could
not be reached (with one exception) during the negotiation phase on how to
review this implementation, on how the states parties could ascertain that
implementation in their own country and elsewhere was on track and in line
with the objectives, and on how that success was in fact being achieved. 
The one exception is Article 63 of UNCAC, which simply provides for
a Conference of States Parties (CoSP) that is to “promote and review”
implementation of UNCAC. However, the CoSP meets for only five days
biennially. It does not have the capacity to collect and analyze information
on implementation. The CoSP realized quite quickly that a supplementary
review mechanism is needed to do this work and prepare recommendations
for the CoSP. 
Peer review offers one tried-and-true supplementary review mecha-
nism.5 The review of the implementation of the recent anticorruption
treaties prepared by the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has shown that direct con-
sultations among experts doing an on-the-ground review provides a an
effective learning experience.6 Talking with experts from other systems
often helps experts understand their own system better and realize that there
are other—and perhaps more effective—ways to deal with an issue.
Despite many observers seeing this as an obvious way forward in con-
nection with UNCAC as well, initially the concept of peer review was not
widely embraced in Vienna where the negotiations on the supplementary
review mechanism were held. Peer review had not previously been used in
connection with the implementation of any N treaty and, thus, there was no
UN precedent. As recently as the second session of the CoSP held in 2008,
there appeared to be firm and widespread opposition to peer review. Less
than two years later at the third session of the CoSP, agreement was reached
on a peer review mechanism. How was implacable opposition turned into
tacit agreement and what can we learn from this exercise?
Our argument in this article is twofold. Negotiations require both tech-
nical experts and diplomats. The technical experts can set out the substan-
tive issues and identify the options. The diplomats can identify the political
sensitivities (in this case, the concept of peer review), thus showing where
compromises might be needed. As long as one side viewed the need for a
UNCAC review mechanism as primarily a technical matter, the negotia-
tions drifted. It was not until both sides understood the political dimensions
that progress could be achieved, which allowed for the negotiators to break
through what appeared to be an impenetrable barrier.7
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Deadlocks
In the literature, the negotiation process has been described as “a sequence of
actions in which two or more parties address demands, arguments and pro-
posals to each other for the ostensible purpose of reaching an agreement and
changing the behaviour of at least one actor.”8 There is significant literature on
negotiation strategies and on the breaking of deadlocks.9 A deadlock occurs
when parties stand firm on inconsistent positions.10 James Sebenius, for exam-
ple, maps the field comprehensively in his examination of negotiation analy-
sis.11 By building on experiences and strategies, he takes us from game theory
to statistical decision theory where analysts rely on objective probabilities.
Sebenius says that negotiation analytic prescriptions typically expect intelli-
gent, goal-seeking action by the parties whereas negotiation analysis seeks to
decompose the problems into characteristic elements. Throughout the rest of
this article, we find this mode of analysis to be very useful.
John S. Odell demonstrates how negotiations that seem to have landed
in an impasse can be turned around.12 Looking for the causal mechanisms
that tip the process one way or another, he explores two case studies, the
World Trade Organization negotiating rounds of 1999 and 2001.13 The 1999
round held in Seattle was spectacularly unsuccessful while the 2001 round
held in Doha achieved results. After description and empirical analysis,
Odell concludes with three propositions:
1. If a party perceives that its alternative to agreement has worsened,
it will shift strategy in the integrative direction, and vice versa.
2. The odds of breaking a deadlock will be greater if parties use some
integrative tactics than if they use strictly distributive strategies.
3. The odds of breaking deadlocks will rise when a good mediator is
involved.14
In this article, in turn, we present original evidence regarding how the
UNCAC negotiations that ultimately resulted, for the first time in connec-
tion with any UN treaty, in the adoption of peer review moved from
impasse to agreement.
The First Session of the Conference of States Parties
When the first session of the CoSP was held in Amman, Jordan, in Decem-
ber 2006, the discussions on a review mechanism were long and convo-
luted. Nonetheless, this dialogue resulted in the crucial political agreement
that CoSP itself was not enough and that a supplementary review mecha-
nism was needed. 
The difficulties were in pinning down exactly what such a mechanism
should look like. The delegates agreed on some of the key features of this
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mechanism: it should be transparent, efficient, nonintrusive, inclusive, and
impartial; it should not produce any form of ranking; it should provide
opportunities to share good practices and challenges; and it should comple-
ment existing international and regional review mechanisms in order to
avoid duplication of effort. The formulation of more specific terms of ref-
erence for the mechanism was delegated to an “open-ended intergovern-
mental expert working group.”
Even though at first glance these are rather bland characteristics, there
was vigorous debate over them in Amman, which revealed that in some key
respects the different sides understood certain concepts differently. For
example, transparency was understood by some to mean that all the states
parties would be involved throughout the process. In effect, the review was
to be carried out by a plenary body, as opposed to a smaller expert body.
Others understood transparency to refer to the ability of all stakeholders
(including, e.g., representatives of civil society) to follow and possibly even
provide input to the review process. Still others understood transparency to
refer to whether or not the reports that are produced as a result of the review
process are available to all states parties or, indeed, are made public. 
A second example was the concept of nonintrusiveness. The UN Char-
ter stipulates that the United Nations may not “intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” The concept is
generally used in international law to mean that the UN has no authority
with respect to disputes that are essentially within domestic jurisdiction.
There appeared to be different views as to what constitutes such interven-
tion. At various stages in the negotiations, arguments based on nonintru-
siveness and the protection of sovereignty were used to counter proposals
for, inter alia, the use of independent experts, the arrangement of country
visits, the use of any information not provided by the government of the
state party under review, and the publication of the full report—all elements
that other negotiators regarded as part and parcel of the peer review process. 
Seeking Common Ground at 
the Second Session of the Conference of States Parties
In preparing for the second session of the CoSP in Bali at the beginning of
2008, the secretariat looked at existing review mechanisms and, on that
basis, set out what it regarded as elements that could be incorporated into
the UNCAC review mechanism: 
• self-assessment (each state party would fill out a questionnaire on
what implementation steps it had taken); 
• review (by which the secretariat meant that the process should be car-
ried out by groups of experts or peers); 
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• dialogue (a “process of constructive dialogue” between the secretariat
and the country concerned, or between the experts or peer reviewers
and the country concerned); 
• cooperation with existing review mechanisms; 
• country visits (the secretariat carefully noted that “the approach taken
by existing review mechanisms with regard to country visits ranges
from no visits at all to visits only where necessary to compulsory
country visits”); and 
• benchmarking and technical assistance.15
Despite the efforts of the secretariat to stake out common ground, the
discussions at the second session of the CoSP can be characterized as
drawn out and difficult. The elements identified by the secretariat in its
background report appeared to meet acceptance on a general level. Once
the discussion entered into details, however, two opposing positions seemed
to emerge. These two positions could be called the open review and the
controlled review positions.
The open review position incorporated many elements found in peer
review within the framework of the OECD or the Council of Europe: a
team of experts collects information from a variety of sources; the team
then visits the country under review in order to meet a wide range of stake-
holders; the team prepares a country report that contains recommendations;
the team submits this draft report to the country under review for comment;
the amended country report together with recommendations is sent to a ple-
nary body for discussion and adoption; the report is published; and there is
some mechanism for follow-up by the plenary body to see whether the rec-
ommendations have been implemented.
According to the controlled review position, a team of experts (who,
according to some who espouse this position, also includes experts repre-
senting the country under review) uses information received from the gov-
ernment to prepare a country report; the report is finalized on the basis of
a dialogue between the experts and the representatives of the country under
review; and the secretariat prepares a general report for the plenary body
that does not contain references to individual countries. The plenary body
decides by consensus on the publication of the general report; whether or
not the country report is published is decided by the country under review.
At the start of the second session of the CoSP, the open review position
was articulated by Portugal, speaking on behalf of the European Union, but
it was also espoused, for example, by the United States and Canada.16 The
delegations of many countries consisted of a mix of experts from the capi-
tals and of career diplomats who in many cases had come to Bali from their
current posts at the UN headquarters in Vienna. The experts tended to be
familiar with the workings of such an open review model within the frame-
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work of the OECD, the Council of Europe, and the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF).
The controlled review position was articulated by Pakistan, speaking
on behalf of the Group of 77 and China.17 According to the official report
of the session, the statement by Pakistan “highlighted that the Conference
should be the only body responsible for the review and that any mechanism
or body to be established should be subsidiary to the Conference.” Further
the Pakistani delegate indicated that the review mechanism should base its
reports exclusively on information provided by states parties and that the
conference should be the competent body to approve and issue reports on
the review of the implementation of the convention.18 Most of the delega-
tions from the Group of 77 and China were small, with a heavy preponder-
ance of career diplomats from Vienna.
Due to the deadlock between the open review and controlled review
positions, little progress could be achieved at Bali. The resolution that
emerged began by essentially repeating what had been decided two years
earlier: if indeed a supplementary review mechanism was to be established,
it should be transparent, efficient, nonintrusive, inclusive, and impartial; it
should not produce any form of ranking; it should provide opportunities to
share good practices and challenges; and it should complement existing
international and regional review mechanisms in order that the conference
may, as appropriate, cooperate with them and avoid duplication of effort.
The resolution continued with a number of general statements about effec-
tive implementation, a balanced geographical approach, the need to be non-
adversarial and nonpunitive, and that implementation should be of a
technical nature and promote constructive collaboration.19
The Governmental Working Group of 2008
The debate shifted from Bali to the UN headquarters in Vienna, where an
open-ended intergovernmental working group met in September 2008. By
the time of that meeting, thirty-one countries had responded to the invita-
tion of the secretariat to submit proposals for the review mechanism.20
The submissions continued to reflect the divide between the open
review and the controlled review positions. Proposals in line with the open
review approach came from member states of the European Union, the
United States, and several other countries. These proposals tended to repeat
the following elements: 
• each state party should be reviewed by experts from other states parties;
• the reviews should preferably involve on-site visits for direct discus-
sions with a wide range of stakeholders;
• a variety of different sources should be used when gathering information;
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• civil society and the private sector should be involved;
• the reports should be published; and
• there should be some type of follow-up on the implementation of any
recommendations made.
Many proponents of the open review position tended to take a techno-
cratic view of implementation and many delegations espousing this view
included technical experts in addition to career diplomats. To these propo-
nents, the review was a technical exercise in reporting and accountability,
and the results should be transparent and available immediately for the
world to see. The experts conducting the review should be free to gather
information on implementation from a variety of sources in order to famil-
iarize themselves with the situation and engage in discussions with a num-
ber of different stakeholders. Armed with this knowledge, they would be
able to suggest best practice to the experts of the country under review.
The Group of 77 and China group submitted a working paper to the Sep-
tember 2008 meeting, laying out in greater detail their vision of the controlled
review model. Among the points made in that paper were the following:
• the reports should be based only on information provided by the
states parties;
• the information provided by the states parties may not be disclosed to
any person or entity without the prior consent of the state concerned;
• the information should be used only for analytical purposes and to
promote effective implementation of UNCAC. In particular, this
information should not be used for political or economic purposes;
• the mechanism should “avoid bringing about political difficulties, or
some kind of selectiveness between Member States”;
• the mechanism should be consistent with the principle of the sover-
eignty of states;
• the mechanism should be transparent and participatory, with all states
parties enjoying equal footing; and
• the operation of the mechanism should be paid on the basis of the
regular UN budget.21
The proponents of controlled review tended to see the process as involv-
ing a number of serious political risks that had to be identified and defused.
Since outside experts lack local understanding, they might receive a dis-
torted view of how the legal and administrative system actually operates in
the country under review. Information obtained during the review process
could be misused for political purposes and, thus, there was a need to keep
tight governmental control on what and how information is used. Non-
governmental actors could in fact be hostile to government policy and might
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use involvement in the review process for their own ends. If the reports pro-
duced as a result of the review process became construed as “UN-endorsed”
assessments of the extent of corruption in a certain country, this could have
a negative impact on foreign investments in that country: donors might seek
to attach a variety of conditions on any offers of technical assistance. There
were also considerable concerns about the expense of on-site visits and other
aspects of peer review, and that the necessary funds would then not be avail-
able for direct technical assistance. 
The Gulf Between the Open Review 
and the Controlled Review Positions
It is clear, then, that there was a great gulf between the two positions. It
seemed as if the two sides were in fact speaking different languages and
represented quite different concerns that were not being openly addressed. 
Part and parcel of the open review position seemed to be the view that
any efforts to oppose such openness were nothing less than a wish to avoid
scrutiny, and that the controlled review group was not really committed to
the objectives of the UNCAC.
The controlled review position seemed to regard proposals for con-
ducting on-site reviews, contacting local civil society organizations, pub-
lishing the reports, and so on as politically based violations of sovereignty
and as attempts to force countries to change their policies through naming
and shaming.
The open review position seemed to revolve around technocratic, sub-
stantive interests that centered on finding the best way to collect and ana-
lyze information on implementation. The controlled review position seemed
to revolve around political interests that focused on finding a politically
legitimate way to evaluate implementation in a sovereign state.
The ensuing negotiations gradually saw the two rigid positions soften.
The initial catalyst for this was that the apparently solid Group of 77 and
China position in support of controlled review soon suffered from defec-
tions. The above-mentioned working paper submitted by the Group of 77
and China in September 2008 did not use the language of peer review at all.
However, a number of developing countries did in fact have favorable
experience with peer review. Most Latin American countries were using
peer review in connection with the implementation of the 1996 Inter-Amer-
ican Convention Against Corruption. In addition, several developing coun-
tries were familiar with peer review in the context of the FATF. As a result,
the debate could not be painted as a North-South one, in which the West-
ern industrialized countries were opposed to the more numerous developing
countries. Those supporting the controlled review position gradually real-
ized that holding out against any form of peer review was not a sustainable
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position, and that some workable format had to be found so that the long
negotiations of UNCAC itself would not prove to be a waste of time and
effort.
Once several developing countries began to express their support for
some elements of peer review, they were understandably received with
open arms by the other camp. The proponents of open review tried to lever-
age this trend by building a growing consortium of like-minded countries
based on a fairly hard-line technocratic position. Their view remained that
peer review should occur on their terms.
In the year following the September 2008 meeting of the intergovern-
mental working group, three more working group meetings were held. In addi-
tion, some informal meetings were held in Vienna, which were attended
almost solely by the diplomats posted there. Progress remained achingly slow. 
By the time of the last working group meeting in August–September
2009, the list of issues that had to be solved remained rather long. The next
session of the CoSP was scheduled to be held in only two months, and con-
sensus was not in sight. It was at this stage that movement could be dis-
cerned among the proponents of open review. What had originally been
seen by many of them as essentially a technical exercise (how to collect and
analyze information most effectively and how to encourage member states
to take the necessary implementation steps) had obviously become imbued
with political sensitivities. One or more informal meetings of the like-
minded group supporting open review were held each week during those
two months. At these meetings, the debate raged and the cohesiveness of
the group began to break down. While some (primarily a few of those del-
egations that included technical experts) wanted to go to the wire, others
(usually career diplomats) argued that the only way to reach the necessary
consensus in Doha was by stepping away from the hard-line technocratic
position. The talk shifted to the potential for compromise with the closed
review proponents and to redlines that should not be crossed. 
The stage was thus set for compromise. 
Compromise at the Third Session 
of the Conference of States Parties
The debate at the third session of the CoSP in Doha, in November 2009,
took place not so much in the plenary room, but in a small room where
about a dozen participants (primarily diplomats), who represented the two
views, worked their way through the issues. In these discussions, the focus
was on finding options that would allow for various elements of peer
review (thus satisfying the concerns of the open review proponents) while
defusing the political risks raised by peer review (thus satisfying the con-
cerns of the controlled review proponents).
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The outcome at Doha can be considered a delicate balance between the
two views.22 The elements of the mechanism are as follows:
• an implementation review group is set up for the review process. This
body is, to use the UN parlance, intergovernmental and open, which
means that any and all states parties may participate;
• each state party is to be reviewed by two other states parties;
• each state party is to designate governmental experts who would actu-
ally conduct the reviews. (Disagreement arose over the definition of a
“governmental expert.” Those opposed to the peer review concept gen-
erally stressed that these experts must be civil servants and that they
reserve the right to refuse to accept anyone who they regard as biased); 
• the review process consists, basically, of four stages: a self-assess-
ment conducted by each state party on the basis of a checklist pre-
pared by the secretariat, discussions between the experts and the
representatives of the authorities of the member state, preparation of
a country report, and discussion at the implementation review group
of consolidated thematic and regional reports;
• in responding to the self-assessment, each state party should seek to
engage in wide consultations with relevant individuals and groups
outside the public sector;
• the experts may also use information produced by other correspon-
ding evaluation mechanisms; 
• on-site visits may be arranged with the consent of the state party
under review. However, the costs of these must come from voluntary
funding, not the regular UN budget;
• in connection with on-site visits, the state party under review is encour-
aged to promote discussions with all relevant national stakeholders;
• on the basis of the evaluation, the experts prepare a country report
and an executive summary. The report and its executive summary
require the approval of the state party under review;
• the secretariat prepares thematic and supplementary regional geo-
graphical reports for the implementation review group;
• these thematic and regional reports will serve as the basis for the ana-
lytical work of the Implementation Review Group. The executive
summary of the country reports are submitted to the implementation
review group for informational purposes only and not for discussion.
(Those opposed to peer review did not want the implementation
review group to be able to open discussion on implementation in a
specific state party, where the authorities of that state party would be
required to respond to questions); and
• the country reports themselves are confidential and, thus for example,
are not submitted as such to the implementation review group. How-
ever, the states parties in question are encouraged to publish these
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reports themselves. In addition, “States parties shall, upon request,
endeavour to make country review reports accessible to any other
State party. The requesting State party shall fully respect the confi-
dentiality of such reports.”
The fact that the outcome is indeed a compromise is borne out by the
interviews that we conducted with key negotiators for the purposes of this
article. Negotiators on both sides appeared to believe that it was their side
that won. For example, a negotiator for the controlled review side estimated
that some 80 percent to 90 percent of what they proposed was approved
“without significant change.” Negotiators for the open review side stressed
that the Doha result clearly leaves the door open to a full peer review pro-
cedure (including, e.g., on-site visits, involvement of civil society, and pub-
lication of the reports) and that, once state parties have more experience
with and confidence in the review mechanism, more and more elements of
peer review will come into play.
How the Negotiations Worked
The negotiations on the mechanism for the review of the implementation of
UNCAC showed the difficulties that arise when one side stresses technical
aspects while the other side stresses political aspects, and neither side is able
to bridge this difference in approach. Peer review is gradually becoming an
established and valued element of the review of implementation, but it does
present risks of misuse. On the other hand, attempts to trim peer review of
some of its essential elements (e.g., on-site visits, the involvement of civil
society, and the publication of reports) may sap it of its vitality.
The negotiations also showed both the benefits and the drawbacks of
negotiating as blocs. Having two clear blocsthe open review proponents
and the controlled review proponents—helped to crystallize the issues on
the table. At the same time, since both of the two sides transcended regional
coalitions, the blocs helped to generate more global support. On the other
hand, both sides appeared to suffer to some degree from a loss of credibil-
ity as a negotiating partner. The Group of 77 and China, as noted above,
suffered from early defections and various developing countries became
vocal supporters of open review. The European Union had a more organ-
ized structure for decisionmaking and negotiation; yet not only was it
unable to maintain a coherent position that would retain other open review
supporters, at times different members of the European Union sent out
mixed signals in the negotiations (e.g., on the issue of the need for on-site
visits) that complicated the position of the lead negotiator.
According to one observer of the negotiations, at a certain stage a sense
of inevitability evolved that the mechanism would be established.23 It was
primarily a question of where the compromises would be found. These
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compromises could not be found until the two sides gradually realized the
importance that each of the sides attached to their own proposals and red-
lines: on the one hand, the use of peer review; and on the other hand, the
concepts of sovereignty, transparency, and nonpunitiveness.
The open review proponents had to convince the controlled review pro-
ponents that peer review was not intended to identify shortcomings as part
of a political agenda or to make people look bad. Instead, the key element
is ownership: the country under review should recognize that it has prob-
lems it needs to overcome and that there are politically acceptable ways to
overcome them. The controlled review proponents had to convince the open
review proponents that the concerns about political risks were valid ones
and that these must be respected.
Conclusion
Reflecting on the theoretical analyses that we discussed in the first part of
this article, it is instructive to see what lessons can be learned from previ-
ous case studies and how propositions might be tested in the future. Statis-
tical decision theory, which is found extensively in the literature, is not
applicable to this case study because objective probabilities were not evi-
dent and there was no basis for objectivity. There were certain subjective
probabilities; namely, coalitions of interests and a wish at times to shift the
focus of the argument. 
Turning to Odell’s three propositions (see the section Deadlocks), this
case study shows how integrative tactics aided an agreement, and especially
the mediators (diplomats) were able to find an agreement by agreeing to a
text by consensus, and consulting more inclusively, and taking the argument
above that of specialist and instrumental operations and focused solutions.
The compromises were not found as much by the technical experts who
came from the capitals. The role of the technocrats was largely to indicate
what options were to be found in the peer review model and to allay the
concerns of those who were less familiar with the concept. The compro-
mises were more often found by the Vienna-based diplomats through an
intensive process of informal consultations during which the two sides
came to better understand one another’s positions. One observer noted that
the bonding between the key negotiators also took place outside the meet-
ings at occasions such as lunch, dinner, receptions, and smoking breaks.
Moreover, because the negotiations lasted for several years, the diplomats
came to have a real and detailed knowledge of the convention itself and of
peer review.24
The main lesson of the UNCAC negotiations is perhaps best encapsu-
lated by one participant: “You should not approach the negotiations from
the point of view that I am right and you are wrong, that you should listen
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to me because I know better. It is better to try to accommodate the differ-
ent general concerns of the state parties. We are all equals and we all have
an interest in the implementation of the Convention.”25  
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